Organisé par : Friederike Moltmann (CNRS)
he received view in contemporary philosophy of language is that sortals are not needed for reference: the reference of a term, especially that of a directly referential term can be fixed without the help of a sortal. In this talk I will present a range of new linguistic generalizations that indicates that reference to abstract objects (such as facts, propositions and numbers) and certain derived objects (such as collections) does indeed require a sortal and cannot be achieved by a ’nonreferential’ expression alone, such as a that-clause, a plural like ’the children’, or a numeral like ’eight’.
I will argue that predicates when taking such a nonreferential expression as complement must be understood in a new way, not as expressing a property applying to an object, but as specifying ’multiple relations’ (for that-clauses), as being multigrade (for plurals), or as syncategorematically interacting with what is expressed by a numeral, as on the ’adjectival strategy’ for treating number terms, discussed in the philosophy of mathematics.
Prerequisites: Some background in semantics is desirable
Friederike Moltmann (CNRS)
Directrice de recherche au CNRS, membre statutaire de l’IHPST